

FMEA
EMU FAILURE MODE, EFFECT ANALYSIS

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Date: 11/15/95

12/24/95 SUPERSEDES 12/24/92

ANALYST:

NAME	FAILURE	TIME TO	REMARKS/				
P/N	MODE &	EFFECT/	HAZARD				
QTY	FUNCTION	ACTIONS	REF				
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY, ITEM 115 SV770540-49 (1)	Permits manual selection of one of four EMU pressure control configurations: 1. OFF BOP and PLSS shutoff valves closed; 2. IV SOP valve closed, PLSS regulator set on 0.9 psig control; 3. PRESS BOP valve closed, PLSS regulator set on 4.3 psig control; 4. EVA BOP valve open, PLSS regulator set on 4.3 psig control. Containing the primary O2 manifold.	<p>115WHT: Carriage lock function CAUSE: Inoperative.</p> <p>CAUSE: Lock torsional spring relaxes or fractures.</p>	<p>MISSION PHASE: PREEVA</p> <p>FAILURE EFFECT: END ITEM: Loss of backup . Latching mechanism which prevents translation of O2 actuator and carriage out of EVA position.</p> <p>GFE INTERFACE: Unable to provide a backup carriage lock when the actuator is in the EVA position.</p> <p>MISSION: None for single failure. Carriage detent provides primary locking function.</p> <p>CREW/VEHICLE: None for single failure. Possible loss of crewman with additional loss of carriage detent, translation of actuator carriage out of EVA position.</p>	<p>FAILURE DETECTION FLIGHT/GROUND: FLIGHT: Yes. visual. 1. Tactile, visual. 2. CWS Message: SET O2 EVA</p> <p>GROUND: None.</p>	<p>TIME TO EFFECT/</p> <p>FLIGHT/GROUND: None. 3/1R</p> <p>TIME: B-N/A</p> <p>AVAILABLE: C-PASS</p> <p>REQUIRED: N/A</p>	<p>CRT: A-PASS</p>	<p>There are dual torsional springs in the lock mechanism. If the O2 actuator moves out of EVA position during EVA, the CVS issues a warning and directs the crewman to reposition actuator to EVA. Redundant path is the first carriage detent function. The carriage detent is a second spring loaded lock, preventing movement of the actuator. This is a standby redundant mechanical linkage. The "N/A" screen does not apply.</p>